ID Partners · for PingAuthorize
Extensions that let PingAuthorize answer the OpenID AuthZEN API directly, know which workload is asking through SPIFFE mTLS and queue evaluation events for a Shared Signals receiver - and a reference design that holds a chain of AI agents to the purpose the customer gave the first one. All of it installs into, or decides through, the PingAuthorize you already run. No proxy in the path, and existing policies need only a one-time binding to the AuthZEN attributes.
POST /access/v1/evaluation
{ "decision": true }
What you get
Serves the OpenID AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0 from inside the server - single and batch evaluation, subject, resource and action search, and discovery - and turns each call into a native PingAuthorize decision or query. Advice mapping is built in; flat attributes, Shared Signals events and a SPIFFE caller check are there when you turn them on.
Explore the adapterSPIFFE mTLS on a PingAuthorize connection handler. The server presents its X.509-SVID, admits only SPIRE-issued clients - optionally pinned to named workloads - and hands the caller's SPIFFE ID to policy. Certificates rotate with no restart.
Explore workload identityA reference design for AI agents that delegate to other agents. Every entity in the token's RFC 8693 act chain is an OpenID Federation entity whose record says what it does in BIAN terms; a small language model reads the words, and PingAuthorize decides on the bank's purpose map - before a token is issued, and again when it is used.
Registration batches and a server profile that configure everything with secrets supplied at setup, patterns for a TLS edge or Kubernetes with SPIRE, and a build that refuses a bundle your server would reject.
See deployment optionsWhere it fits
An agent's enforcement point asks whether agent-42 may transfer from acct-1. Policy can permit, deny, or deny with advice - step_up_required with the scope to obtain, or identity_proofing_required with the credential doctype - so the agent knows what it needs before it tries again.
A customer's task passes through several agents, and every hand-off is a chance for it to drift. Each hop is judged against the purpose of the agent the customer started with - not the one before it - and the first misfit is refused before a token exists for it.
RFC 8693 act chain · OpenID Federation · BIAN purpose mapGateways, applications and agents from different vendors ask the same standard question, with no proprietary SDK in each client. Batch evaluation answers a screenful of checks in one call, and resource search returns the accounts a user may act on, straight from policy.
/access/v1/evaluations · /access/v1/search/resourceA shared key only proves someone holds the key. On the mTLS handler, the calling workload's SPIFFE ID is verified in the TLS handshake and forwarded to policy, so a payments gateway and a batch job can be held to different rules.
Gateway.caller · spiffe://bank.example/…Register a Shared Signals receiver and each evaluation answered by the adapter becomes a signed Security Event Token - subject, action, resource, verdict, any advice and selected context. The adapter queues evaluation events for background delivery. Delivery is best effort.
application/secevent+jwt · RFC 8935 pushSomething outside the customer's purpose that serves nothing else - a bill reminder, say - is neither waved through nor refused outright. It is held for the customer to approve, with the reason the enforcement point can show.
held_for_customer_approval · a decision the customer finishesHow it fits PingAuthorize
Both extensions are PingAuthorize Server SDK extensions: installed with manage-extension and registered with dsconfig, like Ping's own. A servlet extension is reachable only once a connection handler lists it, so which port serves the API, and behind what TLS posture, is configuration rather than code.
That keeps one build for every environment. The AuthZEN Adapter can sit behind a bearer key on a platform that terminates TLS for you, then move to a mutual-TLS handler on Kubernetes with configuration changes and no rebuild. Workload identity lives in the handler too, because on PingAuthorize mTLS is not something a servlet does. Purpose-bound delegation adds nothing to the server: it is policy, a purpose service PingAuthorize calls, and the AuthZEN Adapter as the door every enforcement point knocks on.
Security by design
api-key, or listed SPIFFE IDs with spiffe-required, before exposing it - including the Shared Signals stream endpoint, which returns the receiver's credentials.trust-any-server-cert defaults to true for a loopback engine; set it to false when the engine is reached over a network.